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ORATORS AND DEMOCRACY
Functions and Dvsfunctions of Rhetoric in Classical Athens
SUMMARY
From the last part oí the Íifth century onwards, orators trained in rhetoric
became increasingly important in the Athenian democracy, as politicians, logo-
graphers and lawyers. Because oÍ their expertise in rhetoric as well as admi-
nistration and law they are usually described as the first 'professionals' in the
Athenian political system.
As such, their function in the political and judicial organs in Athens is in a
sense comparable to that of their modern counterparts/ and not necessarily
objectionable. However, our sources from the Íifth and íourth century express a
mainly negative judgment oí orators and rhetoric, and the unanimity of the
various authors on this point is striking. This unanimity and above all the Íact
that even the Attic Orators themselves voice this negative judgment - from
which one may inÍer that their audience in the ekklesla and Ihe heliaia shared
this opinion - indicates that rhetoric was generally regarded as detrimental to
the working of the Athenian democracy.
How can this massive criticism oí orators and rhetoric be explained? lt is not
probable that orators simply happened to be a collectively depraved group and
that their bad reputation can be explained by their collective immorality, as the
sources suggest.
In this study I suggest that the orators merely operated with a different type
of values than at the time were dominant in Athens, as was also the case with
the Sophists, who, because of their adherence to new values, became involved in
a clash with a large part of the Athenian citizenry.
fn De /a division du travail socia/ (Paris 1893) the sociologist Emile Durkheim
has made a distinction between two types of morality, which he called 'mecha-
nical solidarity' and 'organic solidarity'. According to Durkheim the morality in a
society which is characterized by a low degree oÍ division of labour is one oÍ
the 'mechanical solidarity', which can be called a collectivistic morality, whereas
in a society with a greater differentiation oí labour there will develop a morality
of the type 'organic solidarity', which is characterized by secularism and in-
dividualism.
The secularism and individualism which are central features oí the Sophistic
movement were for a great part responsible for the clash between the Sophists
and the ordinary Athenian citizens. Did the moral values of the average Athenian
citizen then bear íeatures of Durkheim's mechanical solidarity? This is one of
the main hypotheses that are tested in this book.
Further hypotheses to explain the dysíunctions oí rhetoric in classical Athens
were inspired to me by S.C. Humphreys' discussion oí Basil Bernstein's theory in
connection with the development of Creek philosophy in the sixth and íifth
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century (Humphreys, 1978, 265 fÍ).
Bernstein presents a more comprehensive analysis than Durkheim, whose dis-
tinction between two types of morality forms a major starting point in Bern-
stein's theory (e.g. Bernstein, 1977,239). The latter covers differences in menta-
lity as well as different uses of language. His concepts restricted code and
elaborated code express the different uses of language of the lower and the
middle classes in modern society respectively, which are connected with difÍerent
types oÍ morality, analogous to Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity, and
differences in perception, knowledge and the prevail ing types of roles. Bernstein
gives a penetrating analysis of how people who are used to a restricted code can
become bewildered when confronted with the behaviour and norms which charac-
terize an elaborated code.
The principal hypothesis which is tested in this study is that the mistrust oí and
hostility towards orators and rhetoric on the part oí the ordinary Athenian
citizens have their origin in this sort of bewilderment, because the latter were
coníronted with a new type of role, an individualistic mentality which went hand
in hand with the professional role, and a kind of knowledge which they did not
understand.
To this end I f irst investigate whether it might legitimately be assumed that
the lower classes in the Athenian democracy adhered to the values of a restric-
ted code. In the second chapter an analysis is made of the most frequently
occurring moral notions in the jurisdiction of the Athenian dikastêria. In the
third chapter the central question is whether this kind of thinking also extended
to the opinions of the average Athenian about democracy, as far as one can
conclude Írom the speeches of the Attic Orators.
As regards the moral notions in the jurisdiction oí the heliaia a remarkable
feature emerges. lt appears from the Íorensic speeches, that Íor a verdict oí a
jury not only the legal point of issue or offence was taken into account, but
also the character and the past of the parties. A good character, which was
shown by one's merits with regard to the polis and one's loyalty to family and
friends, usually served as an argument for the bestowal oÍ kharis, e/eos or
sungnómê, whereas a bad character, the lack of such merits and loyalty, might
evoke orgé, misos or phthonos on the part of the judges.
In modern scholarship these arguments are often left out of account, in spite
oÍ their evident effects. This is done most markedly by the Cerman legal his-
torian Hans Julius Wolff and his students Meyer-Laurin and Meinecke. According
to these scholars the decisions of the drkasféria were based strictly on the letter
of the law and the Athenian heliasts were characterized by very legalistic thin-
king. In their jurisdiction there was not even room íor the principle of equity,
as Meyer-Laurin concludes in his study relating to this subject. In his opinion,
the arguments lexamine in chapter l l  are merely rhetorical tricks.
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ln my view, however, the mechanisms oí kharis, eleos, orgê, rnisos and phtho-
nos in the jurisdiction of the Athenian courts were nof introduced by the rheto-
ricians, although they became indeed the subject of the rhetorical technique of
arousing emotions. I believe that these notions to the Athenian dicasts represen-
ted real values, and an important part oÍ their morality, a kind oí morality
which Schadewaldt characterized as "eine Ethik der Triebe" (Schadewaldt, 1955,
137 f .). In my opinion the effects of these arguments show that the decisions of
the people's court in Athens were not strictly based on the letter of the law. On
the contrary, when the notion of justice, dikaion, occurs in the speeches, it is
especially in connection with exhortations to bestow kharis, eleos, sungnómê,
orgê, misos and phthonos. lt is argued that this idea oí dikaion is not a strict
judicial principle, but the general notion oí justice as it was used in daily l i fe.
The application oí this idea oí dikaion in the jurisdiction oí the people's court
means that l i t igants were judged, not only on the legal issue, but also on their
functioning in their social roles: as a son, brother, íriend and as cit izen. lt can
be shown that the principles oÍ kharis, e/eos and sungnómê function in the
courts, exactly as in social life, on the basis of reciprocity, as a quid pro quo
for services rendered, and that the jurors are addressed as partners in a per-
sonal relationship.
Kharis, eleos, sungnómê and their counterparts are values that bear marked
Íeatures oí a restricted code. One can call these values 'particularistic' as Bern-
stein considers characteristic oÍ a restricted code: they relate to concrete per-
sons in their concrete relationships, and function in a quasi-personal, face-to-
face relationship between litigants and heliasts. Moreover, these values, as they
function in the courts, can be called collectivistic. The litigant is not judged as
an autonomous individual, Íree to choose his own way oí life, but is judged upon
his functioning in the groups of which he is a member, according to the common
values of the community. Bernstein's dictum that in the case of a restricted code
"the culture ... raises the 'we' above 'l' " holds perfectly íor the Athenian
heliasts.
Thereíore it is not likely that the jurisdiction oí the Athenian courts was
based on the principle oí individual responsibility, as Clotz (1904, 607) so opti-
mistically assumed. S.C. Humphreys recently showed the persistence of the idea
oí ' la solidarité de la famille' in the functioning of witnesses. Examination oí the
working oÍ kharis, e/eos, etc. leads to conclusions which correspond with the
results of her research.
There are even more explicit indications that the persons who were on trial
were not perceived as independent individuals by the heliasts. As can be inferred
írom numerous examples in the íorensic speeches, the character and all kinds of
merits oÍ íathers, ancestors, íriends and even of advocates, or the misdeeds and
misbehaviour in the past of relatives, friends and advocates could also contribute
to the acquittal or conviction oí the individual litigant.
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ln the third chapter the hypothesis is tested thai the new, professional role oí
the rhetor was not accepted by the general public. The complaints abor-rt he
orators are sun,eyed as well as the starrdards which \,!ere applied for judgrnent.
The crucial question is wether the norms which were applied to the orators took
into account their proÍessional role. In other words, were the applied standards
characteristic of Durkheim's organic solidarity or of an elaborated code, which
leaves more room for the individual?
Pol i t ica l  as wel l  as forensic  orators are found to be judged main ly  by moral
values which do not diÍfer from those applied to ordinary (weathy) citrzens, and
thus fail to take account oí the orators' proÍessional role. ï-he value-pattern
which emerges from the orations oÍ the Attic Orators is very complex. An inven-
tory oÍ the value terms and of Íurther behavioral norms shows that old and new
values coexisted side by side. The most frequent value terms are.- agathos, aristos
- and other terms related to the concept oí arefé -, khrêstos, khrêsimos, dikaios,
sóphrón, metrios, philopolis and philodêmos.
The persistence in the Athenian democracy of the aristocratic values around
the key concept aretê is, since the work oí Adkins, an established fact. Horve-
ver, in the orations arefé does not appear as the traditional 'competit ive' areté,
in relation to which even the main 'cooperative' value dikaiosunê was oÍ minor
importance, as Adkins assumes. Recent reseach has stressed that aretê in the
Athenian democracy is a 'democratized' areÍé. Moreover, in the orations the
moral, 'cooperative' connotations oÍ aretê are dominant and to be dikaios
proves to be a norm of great importance in the orations, applied to polit ical
leaders especially in the sense oÍ' incorruptable'.
The principal behavioral norms for cit izens and leaders, viz. loyalty to the
polis and its constituent groups, and actual solidarity with these groups, are
mainly - and more explicit ly - expressed by the Ierms philopolis, philodêmos,
sóphrón, metrios and kosmlos. The behavioral rules which are covered by these
terms bear strong Íeatures of a restricted code. The herms philopolis and philo-
dêmos which in the Íourth-century orations are Írequently used to denote the
good leader and the good cit izen, were, as Connor has shown, introduced in the
polit ical vocablulary by the fifth-century demagogues, as part oÍ their 'new style
of polit ics', by which they tried to secure the polit ical support of the lower
classes. Connor stresses that here the polit ical relations were expressed through
the language of personal relations (Connor, 1971, 98).
Hence i t  can be said that  in  the t ime of  the radical  democracy values of  the
pattern o( a restricted code were made normative in politics.
The norms to be sóphrón, metrios and kosmios also show the lack of distinc-
tion between public and private behaviour. As the words phllopolis ancl philodê-
mos, they suggest hat the relationship between cit izen and state, between the
leader and the people, were 'total ' relations, in which every aspect oí the l ife of
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in accordance with public standards, and good management of one's property (in
order to be able to give as much as possible to the state), together with good
public conduct, are important Íeatures of the sóphrón, metrios and kosrnios
citizen.
This is clearly thinking based on a restricted code. These norms leave little
room íor the individual to lead a private life according to self-determined prin-
ciples.
The norms which are expressed by the Attic Orators for citizens and leaders
are thus in sharp contrast with the words oí Thucydides' Pericles in the funeral
oration, where freedom in public and in private liíe are proclaimed as central
values in the democratic ideal. Modern scholars have oíten concluded Írom this
and other passages oÍ the same tenor that in the Athenian democracy roughly
the same values applied as in modern western democracies, especially stressing
the notion of individual liberty.
On the basis of the values and behavioral norms which appear in the orations
I consider it unlikely that the democratic thinking of the Athenians who took
the decisions in the ekk/esia and heliaia in any way resembled with such modern
democratic ideas. On the contrary: according to their values the individual had
to submit himself and his personal interests to those oí the state, and a private
life in accordance with the shared values oí the community represented a special
interest for the state. That this last idea was common in Athenian democratic
thinking can also be inferred from the provisions in the dokirnasia test for
Athenians taking office and the special dokimasia rhêtorón.
In the fourth chapter the investigation focusses upon the professional role of the
rhetor and the central question whether this role involved also a proÍessional
attitude with the marks of an elaborated code, which conÍlicted with the way oÍ
thinking and the values of audiences in the assembly and law courts.
The rhetorical handbook oÍ Anaximenes oÍ Lampsakos, which can be regarded
as more or less representative oÍ the handbooks that in the íourth century were
used by most orators and logographers, seles as the main source íor reconstruc-
ting the attitude and mentality oÍ the orators who worked according to the
principles oí rhetorical theory.
The investigation is directed to two major aspects of an elaborated code: the
individualistic mentality and the abstract knowledge, which, according to Bern-
stein, provides an enormous advantage over people who use only concrete know-
ledge, characteristic of a resfricÍed code. Abstract knowledge is 'context-inde-
pendent', as Bernstein puts it, which means that it can be generalized and used
in different situations, whereas concrete, 'context-dependent' knowledge, to
which people are socialized under a restricted code, has relevance only íor
specific situations.
Although the very mediocre handbook of Anaximenes does not in every respect
l / 5
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presuppose an abstract and analytical approach by orators, it does present the
best-known abstract rhetorical techniques, most oí which can be traced back to
the fifth century, such as the techniques of auxêsis and fapeinósis, makrologia
and brakhylogia, argumentation írom probability, and other rhetorical modes of
demonstration: by sérneia, tekmêria, gnómai, paradeigmata, elenkhoi and enthumê-
mafa. These techniques are oí general applicabil ity and can be called context-
independent.
The application oí such techniques implies a rationalistic attitude which
contrasts strongly with the moralistic attitude oí the Athenian jurors. Above all,
this contrast appears from the prescriptions which Anaximenes gives for the
heuresis, in which the traditional values oÍ dikaion, nomimon and ka/on are
treated as abstract categories for argumentation, under which the concrete
material can be arranged. Thus these values, which were basic in the organs of
the Athenian democracy, are to the orator merely instruments íor persuading hs
audience.
The right oí the individual to íollow his own interests, even if these should
conílict with those of the community and the state, was a hot item in the
Sophistic discussions in the fiíth century and it seems that a rational individua-
listic attitude then íound broader adherence in intellectual circles .
The question arises whether rhetorical traning and theory also were affected
by this individualism. Although traces oÍ the sophistic relativism are found in the
handbooks of both Aristotle and Anaximenes in the treatment of the nornos, even
the more sophistic Anaximenes reílects essentially the same, collectivistic values
as are expressed in the speeches of the Attic Orators.
But what does this tell us about the mentality of the orators themselves?
Again one needs to investigate how a rhetorical handbook expected orators and
logographers to work.
It is argued here that the main principle oÍ presentation oí the material in the
handbooks, the method of antithetical arguments, which can be traced back to
Protagoras, presupposes an individualistic mentality with the orators. This method
can be connected with Protagoras' homo mensura thesis, and thus implies that
different points of view are equally deÍensible. This principle means for example
that someone who has committed an offence can be defended in the same way as
an innocent perscin. One can see how this principle of rhetorical training con-
flicted with the rules which prevailed for a sunêgoros and hence why the Athe-
nian public could judge this method as immoral. This is well i l lustrated by a
statement oÍ Lykourgos: one who takes up the defense of a guilty person is
probably capable of participating in the wrongful act(c. Leocr. 138). But one can
also see how this principle made the role oÍ the orator in the court comparable
to that of a modern barrister. The method oí antithetical arguments leaves room







































the alternatives that are available and, like a modern lawyer, to make a rational
assessment oÍ what is technically defensible.
The fifth chapter explains how some oÍ the most'context-independent' rhetorical
techniques could be used to mislead juries, because the character oí these argu-
ments was not understood.
First are treated the main rhetorical modes oí demonstration which were applied
in the law courts. As appears Írom the handbook of Anaximenes and from the
forensic speeches, these proofs are oÍten only hypothetical and so'prove' hardly
any,thing. How could such proofs be applied successÍully? Bernstein notes that
logical and causal reasoning in the case of a restricted code tends to be under-
developed. lt is likely that the frequent use and success of such proofs were
possible only because of the restricted code thinking of the members of the
jur ies.
Next it is shown how the rhetorical technique of arousing emotions became a
major factor by which the moral basis of the jurisdiction of the heliaia was
undermined. While kharls, e/eos and their counterparts for the heliasts represen-
ted important values relating to concrete persons/ rhetorical theory treated these
as context-independent emotions, which could be aroused to suit any person.
Finally the question is treated whether the complaints about the orators that
they, just like the fifth-century demagogues, only spoke pros hêdonên and pros
kharin and merely tried to areskein, therapeuein and ko/akeuein the people, have
a relationship with techniques that were taught in rhetorical education. Remarks
by the rhetoricians Anaximenes, lsokrates, Alkidamas, Polos and further referen-
ces made by Plato indeed point in that direction.
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